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What Build Build Build has delivered

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by Rosario Guzman

The Duterte presidency is nearing the end of its term, yet we don’t seem to be anywhere near the fulfilment of the big infrastructure dream of the administration. Build Build Build is supposed to be the centerpiece of what could be a Duterte legacy, but the program’s performance is far from defining a grand exit for the administration.

The number has changed

Only 11 of the more than 100 infrastructure flagship projects or IFPs have been completed as of May 2021. The National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) lists another 12 IFPs that may be done by the end of 2021 and another 17 by the end of 2022. If these were even feasible, there would be a total of 40 finished projects under Pres. Duterte’s watch.   

The government started with a list of 75 IFPs in 2017. In 2020, NEDA revised the list twice – increasing this to 104 and then to 112 (no longer including the 7 of the 11 finished projects). It retained only 42 of the original 75 and added new ones that are more doable, or that are not even defined as public works such as the national ID system, or projects that are merely continued from previous administrations. The list was obviously revised to increase the chances of completing a respectable number of projects.

Of the 11 projects completed so far, six were not included in the original 2017 IFP list. Two of these six – the LRT 2 East Extension and the Metro Manila Skyway Stage 3, were even started under the previous administration. Of the 12 IFPs expected to be finished by the end of this year, 11 are new additions to the list including two previously identified projects that had also been started long before Pres. Duterte’s term – the Unified Grand Central Station (a previous commitment by the Arroyo administration but was stalled due to disputes) and the Malitubog-Maridagao Irrigation Project (started in 2011). Of the 17 IFPs for completion by end of 2022, only the Chico River Pump Irrigation Project was in the 2017 list, while the rest were only added last year.

Even if we do see the completion of these 29 IFPs by the end of 2021 and 2022, all the finished projects will still just amount to Php365.24 billion which is only 7.8% of the total project cost of Php4.7 trillion for all targeted IFPs. Much remains to be done actually, with 51 projects going beyond 2023 while 28 others are still in the pipeline.

Driven by debt and private capital

Nevertheless, the Duterte administration has already crowed about its unmatched performance in infrastructure, citing as an indication of its seriousness the almost 100% increase in government spending for this, from Php590.5 billion in 2016 to Php1,019 billion in 2021. It has increased infra spending as percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) from 3.9% in 2016 to 5.1% in 2021. The annual average of 5% infra spending as percent of GDP in 2017-2021 even surpasses the annual average of 3.4% under the Marcos dictatorship. This is even despite the 21.4% decline in disbursements last year due to the pandemic.

In the Sulong Pilipinas forum of the administration in April this year, the economic managers took turns highlighting how the administration has boldly financed infrastructure for economic development in contrast to the Aquino administration’s lackluster performance.

However, more than half (56%) of the indicative amount for the IFPs is from official development assistance (ODA), mostly as loans, while only 3.9% comes purely from the General Appropriations Act (GAA) or the national budget. Conspicuously, there are now 20 unsolicited public-private partnerships (PPPs) where there was none before, comprising 32% of total cost.

There are seven other PPPs worth Php244.2 billion or another 5.2% of the total cost. Five of these PPPs, all expressways, are components of the Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement (STOA) entered into by the government’s Toll Regulatory Board (TRB), Ramon Ang’s Citra Central Expressway Corp., and the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC). STOA ensures the identification, adjustments and collection of toll rates upon the completion of the projects.

The government has also mixed PPP with ODA in the case of LRT-1 Cavite Extension Project to be accomplished beyond 2023, and with GAA in the case of Metro Cebu Expressway Project which is still in the pipeline. There is also ODA mixed with GAA in the case of Davao City Coastal Road Project to be done after 2023.

PPP was the preferred funding scheme of the Aquino presidency, which was criticized not only for its slowness but more importantly for benefiting the real estate and infrastructure tycoons. The then incoming Duterte presidency declared that the state would proactively make an investment, raising hopes that infrastructure would finally be cheaper and more relevant to public needs. But in reality, the government simply shifted to ODA loans especially from Japan and China; in particular, the share of China ODA to total ODA to the Philippines increased from a negligible 0.01% in 2016 to 2.73% as of 2019. The Duterte presidency also ended up still relying on private capital, unsolicited proposals at that, to expedite projects. Overall, it appears that the promised change of having a genuinely state-led infrastructure development and presumably for maximum public benefit has not come at all.

Instead, the administration doubled its gross borrowings from Php507 billion in 2016 to Php902 billion the following year, breaching the unprecedented Php1 trillion mark in 2019 and nearly tripling this in 2020. The national government outstanding debt as of May 2021 is Php11.1 trillion – it was only Php6 trillion when Pres. Duterte took over.

Building up foreign investors and oligarchs

Unsolicited proposals for PPPs from the private sector are allowed under the 1990 Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) Law (Republic Act 6957 as amended by Republic Act 7718), the country’s watershed legislation towards privatized infrastructure development. These projects do not require direct government guarantee, subsidy or equity, and presumably involves a new concept or technology. The BOT Law also defines and allows the Swiss Challenge as the procurement system to be followed for unsolicited proposals, where upon the project proposal of a private entity, the government invites similar or competitive proposals from third parties which the original proponent can still match afterwards.

Pres. Duterte adopted the Swiss Challenge and eliminated the normal bidding process for public works, wherein the government presents the specifications of the procurement and invites entities to make offers, which could be in an open or closed bidding. Controversially, Malacañang argued that this would quicken the pace of Build Build Build and minimize corruption. On the contrary, the Swiss Challenge can potentially concentrate infrastructure control to only a few proponents as well as government officials. It can definitely lower transparency, such that the novelty of the concept or technology does not get to be subjected to public scrutiny. In other words, the government has skipped the development planning process and relied on what the private sector wants to embark on, thereby making infrastructure inherently exclusive rather than inclusive.

All of the unsolicited PPPs are for transport and mobility. In fact, 76 of the 112 IFPs, or 91% of the total project cost, are for transport and mobility. Likewise with 71% of the total project cost of the 40 projects that the administration hopes to announce as done by 2022. Build Build Build prioritizes transport and mobility as though the country’s transport and traffic problems take precedence over the crisis and stagnation of agriculture and manufacturing.

In reality, the ‘infrastructure ambition’ is about three things for the Duterte administration. It is about providing the infrastructure foreign investors want – to improve connectivity to the economic zones and ease the cost of doing business. The country’s creditors, notably the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), have been nagging the Philippine government to make pleasant infrastructure to increase the country’s creditworthiness and investment grade and to attract much-needed foreign investment in the import-export economy. That is visibly the first and basic reason for making Build Build Build look grand and why past administrations had merely focused on providing infrastructure as their primary task in a liberalized and privatized economy.

Secondly, Build Build Build is about providing foreign and local investors and builders the business they want. The Duterte administration wanted to take advantage of the global infrastructure investment glut that was largely untapped in 2016 by flashing a grand infrastructure menu card. In short, it has promoted infrastructure as the foreign investment destination, along with energy, water and public utilities which also have vast infra needs. This has immensely enriched foreign infra, utilities, construction and transport technology corporations despite the rise in global interest rates and prolonged global economic slide. And now, despite the pandemic and declining global investments, the Duterte administration continues to sell the dream.

Thirdly, Build Build Build is about boosting the wealth of the country’s economic oligarchs, especially those in real estate construction, ports building, transportation, energy and water, and the consequent speculation on values of land and natural assets. International and national media have observed how Pres. Duterte has empowered a new business elite, the “Dutertegarchs”, and created his own set of cronies who have benefited from full-scale liberalization of foreign investments and private capital in otherwise public goods and domain.

Legacy of deeper crisis

Much of the hyped benefits from embarking on a massive infrastructure program have failed to materialize. Build Build Build has been the Duterte administration’s only hope to arrest the economic slowdown pre-pandemic, and now to recover the economic collapse during the pandemic and beyond.

But it has been the wrong choice of policy from the start. The economy needs mending in its production sectors, especially those catering to domestic needs and that have the capability to create meaningful jobs for the mass of jobless and sustainable incomes for the poor majority. But the government has chosen to spend on boosting investor confidence and opportunities. Even spending on health pales in comparison with the Php1.1 trillion allocation for infrastructure in the 2021 budget.

Consequently, this wrong policy mindset only boosts the production of infra materials by the corporations of the contracting countries. In the case of ODA for instance, loans are always preconditioned by the host country’s use of the so-called donor country’s contractors, technology as well as businessmen. At one point, China even pushed for the use of its own workers in Philippine projects. Consequently, this has increased the country’s imports bill, resulting in the country’s worst trade deficit. But the more important consequence is that Build Build Build’s reliance on foreign contractors and materials has undermined our chance of locally producing these materials and building our own infrastructure using local resources. Even the absorptive capacity, the ability to “learn and use” external knowledge, of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) and Department of Transportation (DOTr), is limited.

Build Build Build has also failed to deliver the jobs generation that the administration has imagined as one of the benefits. Every year since 2017, the growth in construction employment has been a lot smaller than in 2016. The projected job generation from Build Build Build of 1.2 million annual average in 2017-2022 is a far cry from reality. The annual average job generation from all sectors pre-pandemic or 2017-2019 only reached 313,000,[1] the lowest among all administrations post-Martial Law. We lost 2.6 million jobs last year.

Optimists have looked forward to the public services that may be improved with the finished projects, even if these are not exactly the kinds of infrastructure that are much needed to recover lost jobs and incomes. But that is also one of the follies of debt-driven and privatized infrastructure development – we get to pay for these increasingly irrelevant projects with our taxes and high user-fees. Build Build Build has been backed by the most regressive tax reform the country ever had and the built-in automatic upward adjustments in toll fees, fares and other user-fees.

In all probability, in the future post-pandemic as the economy yields lower returns on investment, the debt owed today will be more expensive than initially computed. This will mean heavier debt burden, more anti-poor and regressive taxes, and higher user-fees for so-called public services. In all certainty by then, we can say that the grand infrastructure age has delivered a legacy of untold poverty and deeper economic crisis. #

[1] Average of 2017-2019 only because of change to 2013 Master Sample Design in 2016

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Kodao publishes IBON articles as part of a content-sharing agreement.

The fate of BBB in the time of COVID-19

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by Jose Lorenzo Lim

The COVID-19 lockdown and further containment measures are drastically slowing down economic activity in the Philippines and elsewhere. The government sees the Build, Build, Build (BBB) program as jumpstarting the Philippine economy in the time of the pandemic. But with its current neoliberal framework, will BBB be enough?

Even before COVID-19, multilateral funding institutions like the World Bank and Asian Development Bank (ADB) have been pushing for an infrastructure offensive especially in developing countries. Moreover, as early as the late 1980s the World Bank proposed using the private sector to fund and undertake these projects in lieu of the Keynesian idea of giving the State a bigger role in the economy especially in terms of large public spending.

The Golden Age of Infrastructure

Infrastructure is a tool for reducing poverty and driving economic growth. But the current framework of infrastructure development in the Philippines and other developing countries is profit-driven and hence overly focused on economic infrastructure. Contrarily, development in so-called advanced and high-income countries such as the US, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan also included substantial public investment in social infrastructure such as education and health.

The Duterte government’s focus on a narrow set of economic infrastructure is aimed at attracting foreign capital. This is driven by the belief that having better infrastructure attracts more foreign investments, which enables countries to attain economic development. The World Bank claimed that, in Asia, around US$8.6 trillion worth of infrastructure investments are required in 2010-2020 to achieve economic development. It cited a huge infrastructure investment gap in Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America, which are mostly composed of developing countries.

One of the promises of the Duterte government is to usher in a “Golden Age of Infrastructure” through its grandiose BBB program. The project includes high-impact projects under the Department of Transportation (DOTr), Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), and the Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA) to build more railways, urban mass transport, airports and seaports, more bridges and roads, and new and better cities.

In selecting the original 75 flagship projects, the government applied the following criteria, among others: 1) consistency with regional and national development plans; 2) implementability (i.e. must be accomplished within the Duterte administration); 3) high economic impact with 10% minimum social discount rate; and 4) “big-ticket” (above Php500 million or US$10 million).

Etienne Girardet@etiennegirardet/Unsplash

Issues, from 75 to 100

Despite the supposedly meticulous criteria for identifying the most important projects to undertake, many issues surround the infrastructure flagship projects (IFPs). Its neoliberal fixation with pleasing investors and big business puts to question whether or not it will benefit the people and lead to genuine development.

First, the identification of IFPs was problematic from the start. In November of 2019, the government announced that it revised the list of IFPs from 75 to 100. The National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) Board chaired by the President approves each project before it is even considered as a flagship infrastructure project. However, the BCDA said that the Duterte administration put the wrong projects on the list. Moreover, some projects turned out to be unfeasible, which is strange because this was presumably a basic criterion for selecting the 75 flagship projects in the first place.

The Duterte administration had been boasting of the 75 IFPs since assuming office in June 2016. Former Budget and Management Secretary Benjamin Diokno was even optimistic that the Duterte administration would complete 74 of the 75 projects before its term ends in 2022. Now, the BCDA expects only 38 of the 100 IFPs to be completed by the time Duterte steps down.

The Metro Manila Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) Line 1 and Line 2 and Cebu BRT project, for example, were taken out of the 75 IFPs due to narrow roads and right-of-way issues. The DOTr even wrote a letter to the NEDA Investment Coordination Committee (ICC) to cancel the projects. Yet the projects were eventually re-included after a technical inspection by the World Bank and NEDA on Quezon Avenue (one of the main stations of Metro Manila BRT) and in Cebu.

The Metro Manila and Cebu BRT projects are targeted to be funded by France and the World Bank, but they have faced problems with financing. It also did not augur well that Pres. Duterte suspended all talks on loans and grants from the 18 countries that supported a United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) resolution to probe his controversial drug war, which included France. Ultimately, the fate of the Metro Manila BRT is in limbo since it is no longer among the 100 IFPs. The Cebu BRT meanwhile is still included and is targeted for completion by 2021.

Second, the priorities of the infrastructure projects are questionable. The majority of the projects are for transport when the country badly needs social infrastructure. For instance, there is a need especially for more hospitals and health facilities as bared by the country’s glaring incapacity in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic. The country also badly needs infrastructure for agriculture production, and to support local industries.

The 100 IFPs are now composed of projects for transport and mobility (73), water resources (10), urban development (9), information and communication technology or ICT (6), and power and energy (2). The overwhelming majority are for transport and mobility. In the absence of a basic strategy for developing agriculture and domestic industry, these will mainly end up supporting the overly import-oriented and export-oriented enterprises constituting our economic backwardness.

Third, BBB will be hugely funded by loans from other countries and financial institutions and will further bloat Philippine debt. The 100 IFPs are worth around Php4.3 trillion and official development assistance (ODA) is the biggest funding source of projects. There will be Php2.4 trillion funded with ODA, followed by Php1.2 trillion through public-private-partnership (PPP) funding, and Php172 billion funded solely from the General Appropriations Act (GAA).

Leading the ODA funders is Japan with a total of around Php1.3 trillion, China with Php700 billion, and ADB with Php273 billion. Data from NEDA as of June 2019 show that the Philippines has US$8.1 billion worth of ODA loans from Japan, US$2.8 billion from ADB, and US$273 million from China.

Fourth, contrary to the goal of infrastructure pushing development, most of the 100 IFPs are still centered in Luzon, where poverty incidence is relatively lower compared to other parts of the country.

Of 26 projects worth Php1.6 trillion in Luzon, the biggest concentration of 22 projects worth Php916.5 billion will be built in the National Capital Region. Meanwhile, there are 17 projects worth Php474.6 billion in Visayas, and 25 projects worth Php474.4 billion in Mindanao. Additionally, there are projects worth Php913.5 billion that will be implemented nationwide, the bulk of which is taken up by the New Manila International Airport located in Bulacan.

Fifth, vested interests appear to be benefiting from the BBB infrastructure offensive. Bong Go’s family has been accused of being the largest contractor in BBB projects. Go’s father, Desiderio Go, owns the Davao-based construction company CLTG builders. Through CLTG builders, the Go family secured 20 contracts in 2017 for road networks in Davao. These were worth around Php3 billion in solo projects and joint ventures. In 2018, CLTG Builders also bagged Php116 million worth of projects in Davao.

Aside from Go’s family, other businessmen may also be gaining from the BBB program. For instance, DPWH secretary Mark Villar’s father, Manuel Villar, through Prime Asset Ventures Inc. (PAVI) is eyeing two unsolicited proposals worth Php213.3 billion. These include the LRT 6 Cavite Line A project worth Php56.3 billion and the Cavite LRT Line 6c and Sucat Line 6b projects worth Php157 billion.

The COVID-19 pandemic does call for a “new normal”. This should include a change in the way the government spurs economic growth where the current infrastructure push is becoming irrelevant.

Fons Heijnsbroek@fonsheijnsbroek51/Unsplash

Jumpstarting the economy

The BBB program is seen by the government as essential in jumpstarting the economy. While economic managers have already insisted that they will hardly touch funding for infrastructure projects to augment the budget for COVID-19 response, they took a step back and realigned some of the infrastructure budget.

The DOTr in April realigned funding for infrastructure projects worth Php16.9 billion that is from 35 projects. The MRT-3 rehabilitation and the PNR Clark Phase 1 are some of the projects that had their budget realigned for the government’s COVID-19 response, which are transportation related.

Data from NEDA show that there are 34 projects from the 100 IFPs that are already being implemented. Of the 34 projects, 26 are transport and mobility related, 2 are ICT projects, 3 are urban development, and 3 are water resources.

Meanwhile, there are 43 pending projects in the 100 IFPs to be implemented within 6-8 months. Majority is still composed of transport and mobility projects with over 30 projects, 4 water resource projects, 4 ICT projects, and 5 urban development and redevelopment projects.

These roads and airports under the 100 IFPs would have been useful to aid economic activity in the long run, particularly tourism and trade. But will these be useful in the “new normal”? For instance, the Department of Tourism has already acknowledged that the number of foreign visitors will drastically fall until at least next year. The United Nations World Tourism Organization estimates that foreign travel will fall by 20-30% and tourism receipts by one-third in 2020. Meaning, the tourism industry in the time of COVID-19 is practically suspended indefinitely.

The 2020 Budget of Expenditures and Sources of Financing shows that the government has allotted Php989.2 billion for infrastructure outlays. Of this, the highest share or Php349.9 billion is allotted for road networks. Government should review the budget for road network projects which could be additionally used for the country’s COVID-19 response. Another source could be the outlay for airport systems worth Php2.4 billion.

The composition of BBB projects being mostly road networks and airports is attributed to its business and trade inclined framework. Basically, the aim of the government’s infrastructure program is to push for high-impact projects to stimulate the economy and arrest its further slowdown and possible decline. But while the Philippines does need these types of infrastructure, the factor of the COVID-19 pandemic highlights a long-overdue change in this framework.

Josue Isai Ramos Figueroa@jramos10/Unsplash

The future of infrastructure

Looking at IBON’s economic blueprint dubbed People Economics, developing the countryside, building Filipino industries and protecting the environment could be used as the new framework for the government’s infrastructure development.

One way to reframe the government’s infrastructure program in the time of COVID-19 is to focus on social infrastructure such as government hospitals and health centers in the provinces, sanitation facilities on barangay level, and housing projects for the poor. This should be coupled with a plan for countryside development and building rural and national industries. This puts substance in a ‘Balik-Probinsya’ program if it genuinely aims inclusive development.

With a plan of building Filipino industries and making them competitive, the Philippines won’t have to be dependent on importing a wide range of commodities. The countryside could also benefit from a much-needed infrastructure push with irrigation, post-harvest facilities, farm-to-market roads, and ICT projects such as marketing, prices and production support. This does not end with a basic social services and infrastructure push but ensuring that people have decent jobs and living wages to support domestic consumption and demand. Decongesting Metro Manila then won’t be a problem.

The Philippines has to improve the current state of infrastructure especially in the context of COVID-19: one that supports a strong public health system and the stable production of the nation’s needs in order to withstand and battle a pandemic. The problem with the BBB program is how this massive infrastructure program is not only disconnected from correcting but even reinforces the fundamental problem. BBB ignores the need for reliable, strong and public-controlled social services and public utilities infrastructure, for agricultural development and national industrialization, and healthy environment.

What infrastructure to build should figure in a larger strategic plan that supports sustainable consumption and production and social well-being. The current infrastructure framework needs to be transformed. #

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The author is a researcher at IBON Foundation. His research topics include Build, Build, Build, the oil industry, and social services. Prior to IBON, he served as Editor-in-Chief of the UPLB Perspective for the academic year 2016-2017. When not in the office, Jose Lorenzo enjoys writing with his fountain pens and trying out new ink.

Kodao publishes IBON articles as part of a content-sharing agreement.