‘Stop the dump’: Pacific communities protest Japan’s release of treated nuclear water

Scientists monitoring the process say it is safe

By Mong Palatino / Global Voices

Protests were organized across the Pacific region after Japan started releasing treated water from the decommissioned Fukushima nuclear plant into the Pacific Ocean.

In March 2011, an earthquake and tsunami resulted in a nuclear disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant which contaminated the groundwater with radioactive materials. This water has been collected, treated, and stored onsite since 2011.

Since 2021, the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) has been preparing the infrastructure for the “safe” release of Fukushima’s treated water through a process called the Advanced Liquid Processing System (ALPS). The Japanese government has approved the plan but various stakeholders raised alarm about its impact not just in Japan but also in the Pacific region.

On August 24, Japan started discharging treated water amid lingering concern about the damage it may cause. TEPCO explained the process of releasing the water which will take place over the next three decades:

During the initial stages of sea discharge, a very small amount will be carefully discharged using a two-step process.

Firstly, as Stage 1 of the initial discharge of ALPS treated water, today, a very small amount of ALPS treated water will be diluted with seawater and stored in the vertical discharge shaft (upstream water tank) in order to verify that ALPS treated water is being diluted as planned. After this stored water has been sampled and tritium concentrations measured, we will move on to Stage 2, continuous discharge into the sea on and after August 24.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been monitoring the preparation of TEPCO and it released a report noting the “negligible” impact of the treated water on the environment.

IAEA concluded that Japan’s approach and activities to discharge ALPS-treated water are consistent with relevant international safety standards. The report noted that the controlled, gradual discharges of the treated water to the sea, as currently planned and assessed by TEPCO, would have a negligible radiological impact on people and the environment.

The Pacific Islands Forum, the official group of Pacific governments, said that it will continue its engagement with Japan for more information and transparency, although it is divided on whether it will support or reject the release of treated water.

But for Pacific environment groups, the dumping of treated water is tantamount to destroying marine life and the future of the region. Justice Pacific’s statement reflects this popular sentiment among non-government organizations:

The implications of Japan’s decision to dispose of nuclear waste water in such a manner are far-reaching and potentially catastrophic. It not only poses a severe threat to marine life and ecosystems but also raises serious concerns about the health and safety of Pacific communities that depend on these waters for their livelihoods and sustenance.

In Fiji, hundreds of residents took to the streets to denounce Japan’s dumping of treated water into the Pacific Ocean. The Pacific Feminist Community of Practice warned about potential radiation exposure:

Japan’s actions in releasing radioactive waste water from the #Fukushima nuclear disaster into the #Pacific ocean is adding to intergenerational burdens for our region. The science is in, no matter what this violent and poisonous industry says. There is no safe dose of radiation.

During the protest, community leaders mentioned the painful experience of Pacific islands which became nuclear testing grounds of developed countries like the United States and France for several decades. The same communities face heightened risk linked to the harsh impact of climate change. The threat posed by any potential disastrous impact caused by the discharge of treated water from Fukushima exacerbates the suffering of these communities.

Participants in the protests also shouted slogans inspired by the anti-nuclear movement in the region like this one: “If it is safe, dump it in Tokyo! If it is safe, test it in Paris! If it is safe, store it in Washington! But keep our Pacific nuclear free!”

Dr. Marco de Jong, a Sāmoan New Zealander and Pacific historian, spoke to Teuila Fuatai and discussed how science is being used to silence the voices of dissent in the Pacific.

To suggest that Pacific people are approaching this unscientifically is a supreme form of colonial gaslighting that diminishes our collective rights, our rights to self-determination, and our proper concern for intergenerational impacts. It’s simply untrue and leans into racist stereotypes — that as Pacific people, we’re not capable of understanding complex issues. When, really, we know our rights and we know that this is a transboundary harm issue.

Protests have been reported too, in Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, and the Philippines. Meanwhile, China has banned the importation of seafood from some prefectures in Japan. #

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A new platform monitoring press freedom in Southeast Asia

Seven groups are monitoring press freedom cases in six countries

By Mong Palatino / Global Voices

Seven Southeast Asian media organizations have launched pfmsea.org, a joint platform to monitor press freedom across the region.

The organizations are Indonesia’s Alliance of Independent Journalists (AJI), Association of Timor Leste Journalists, Cambodian Journalists Alliance Association, Center for Independent Journalism in Malaysia, Merdeka Media Movement in Malaysia, National Union of Journalists Philippines, and Prachatai in Thailand.

Launched on May 29, 2023, the website shares real-time data on cases of violence against journalists and the media, as well as qualitative reports on the situation of press freedom in six countries, joint press releases, and a mechanism that allows the public to report cases of violence against the media.

Through email, Global Voices interviewed AJI Secretary-General Ika Ningtyas about the new initiative. She shared how regional media groups coordinated in launching the platform.

Most of us have been working together for quite a long time, belonging to regional organizations that unfortunately did not last long enough. But we understand the urgency of the need to build a new one as press freedom is increasingly threatened in most countries in Southeast Asia. Finally, since last year, we had quite intense discussions for a year to rebuild the collaboration with a new approach.

She explained what promoted the groups to launch a platform. She hopes the network will be easy to maintain.

We discussed how to do it simply and at a low cost. Our current strategy is not to establish a permanent organization like before. Instead, this collaboration is more flexible. We chose one organization in turn as the facilitator responsible for facilitating each meeting, managing finances, and other administration. In this first year, AJI was chosen as the collaboration facilitator.

Then we discussed about the work program, several ideas emerged, one of which was to create a joint press freedom monitoring platform. We thought it was important to have data available in real-time that shows the safety of journalists and media organizations in Southeast Asia.

Asked about how the monitoring data will be used to promote press freedom, she discussed the campaign strategy of the network.

The promotion of press freedom requires reliable data. Data that is available in real-time can show the real situation, about the mode, perpetrators, types of threats and see how the trend is from year to year, whether it is improving or worsening. From the data, we or each organization can determine what intervention actions should be taken, what the advocacy strategy is, and how to do it. Through this monitoring data, we can campaign together more broadly about the security situation of journalists in Southeast Asia because we found some similar trends used by governments such as the increase in digital attacks, the use of disinformation regulations to target journalists, and others.

In 2022, their groups monitored 185 press freedom violations across the region. This year, they have recorded 73 cases. About 60 percent of the cases this year involved physical attacks targeting the media, while 23 percent were related to digital attacks. About 36.5 percent of the cases were perpetrated by state actors. Some of the major issues they noted include the forced closure of independent media outlets in Cambodia, the enforcement of repressive media laws in Indonesia, and the vilification of journalists in the Philippines.

Finally, Ika Ningtyas identified some of the challenges in developing the monitoring platform.

The initial challenge was how to set a common standard for indicators, working mechanisms, and report formats. Because we found that several organizations that monitor press freedom have different indicators. Then we agreed to use internationally accepted standards, namely according to Sustainable Development Goals number 16.10.1 where the safety of journalists is one of the indicators. By using this SDG’s indicator, it will be easier if each organization prepares a shadow report related to the SDG’s on the safety aspect of journalists.

Secondly, of the six organizations that have joined, only three regularly monitor cases. But our members in Timor Leste, Malaysia and Thailand are not very intense in monitoring, because they don’t have special resources. So the challenge is how to provide support especially to organizations that don’t have resources and strengthen those that do. Because monitoring is not just inputting data, but a long process such as receiving reports, verifying each case that occurs, writing reports and analyzing them.

The network is planning to expand the coverage of the project by seeking potential partners in Myanmar and Vietnam. #

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Jeepney strike succeeds, but anti-phaseout campaign continues

by Mong Palatino/Global Voices

Filipino jeepney drivers, operators, and their supporters conducted a two-day transport strike to protest the government’s modernization program, which critics said would lead to the phaseout of the iconic Philippine-made vehicle.

After World War II, Filipinos modified the surplus vehicles left behind by American military troops who were stationed there and turned them into jeepneys which became a popular mode of public transportation across the country. Many have since been decorated and revamped in colorful paint and patterns, and are considered an essential part of Philipines transport for both residents and tourists alike.

A jeepney in Legazpi City. Via Wikipedia, license (CC BY-SA 4.0)

The strike was supposed to last for a week, but organizers ended the protest on the second day (March 7) after the office of the Philippine president met transport leaders and said the government would commit to reviewing the modernization program and consult all stakeholders.

In 2017, the Department of Transportation (DOTr) launched its Public Utility Vehicle (PUV) Modernization Program, which proposed replacing traditional jeepneys with a modern version that is “safe, reliable, convenient, and environmentally sustainable.”

Transport groups insisted that they are not against modernization, but they said that the timeline of the government would displace many jeepney drivers and operators who are unable to consolidate or form a cooperative. Furthermore, they appealed for subsidies because the majority of drivers cannot afford to buy a modern vehicle to replace the traditional jeepneys. PISTON, one of the strike organizers, reiterated their position:

The government announcement of a June 30, 2023 deadline for the jeepney phaseout led transport groups to declare a strike.

In response, the DOTr extended the deadline for another six months. But transport groups vowed to continue with the protest as they asked Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. to listen to their demands.

In anticipation of the strike, schools and offices announced the shift to online operations. Government vehicles were also deployed to offer free rides to stranded passengers.

Transport groups in the country’s main urban centers widely participated in and supported the two-day strike. It also received the support of activists and concerned citizens who criticized the government’s modernization scheme for being anti-poor. The multisectoral No to PUV Phaseout Coalition issued this statement in support of the strike:

The fight of drivers and small operators also belongs to the people. Without a franchise, operators will lose their livelihoods. Drivers will have no jeepneys to use. Millions will have to endure the lack of access to affordable transportation.

Some legislators also asked the government to review and reconsider its so-called modernization program. Senator Chiz Escudero asked about the rationale for replacing jeepneys with vehicles from China and Russia.

There are no safeguards whatsoever with respect to the affected drivers and operators who will be displaced because of this supposed modernization. The Philippines is known for its jeepneys and all of a sudden, overnight, they want to phase it out and replacing it with these square looking buses from China and Russia?

Vice President Sara Duterte, who is also the education secretary, lambasted the “communist-inspired” strike for disrupting the learning recovery of students. In response, the Alliance of Concerned Teachers explained why many public school teachers are supporting the strike.

Many of our students and teachers have family members who are PUV drivers who are about to lose their livelihood. Our difficult realities and the scantiness of government funding for education are the real serious impediments to education recovery, so much more than the coming transport strike.

As the protest entered its second day, the office of President Marcos reached out to the strike leaders and held a dialogue. Marcos said later in a media interview that the government will ensure the livelihood and welfare of jeepney drivers.

Transport groups declared the strike a success, but they vowed to continue the campaign against the planned phaseout of jeepneys.

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Typhoon Rai aftermath highlights Duterte’s sluggish disaster response

Affected communities continue to appeal for help

By Karlo Mongaya/Global Voices

The prolonged aftermath of Typhoon Rai (local name Odette) highlights the Rodrigo Duterte government’s sluggish response to the storm, which wreaked havoc across

the Visayan Islands and parts of Mindanao in the Southern Philippines on December 16, 2021.

Affected communities and local governments have been appealing for help after the typhoon-ravaged agricultural zones across Samar, Leyte, Bohol, Cebu, and Negros Islands and even overwhelmed Cebu City, a major commercial and cultural hub in the Visayas-Mindanao regions.

Typhoon Rai destroyed thousands of homes while the damage to agriculture, infrastructure, and other properties displaced people’s livelihoods and left many more without electricity, internet connectivity, or access to water.

Various civil society groups and private sector actors are leading relief and donation drives to provide immediate assistance to affected communities.

Initial relief goods and other assistance gathered by Balsa Mindanao and Sisters Association in Mindanao arrived in Surigao City on Christmas Day. Thank you to all volunteers and those who donated for this relief mission.

Yet Duterte and his officials have failed to respond to the crisis, using excuses such as depleted governmental funds, media underreporting, and impassable roads to deflect blame for the government’s delayed disaster response and garner public sympathy.

Depleted funds?

The impending arrival of Typhoon Rai did not merit any public statement from President Duterte.

When the president spoke in a televised government briefing a day after the typhoon amid calls for immediate government response, he claimed he was still looking for funds to assist typhoon survivors as the government’s money had been “depleted” because of the pandemic:

This COVID really emptied our coffers. So we’re trying to screen how much we can raise so that we can marshal it to the areas affected.

On December 22, Duterte announced that he would be directing USD 199 million (PHP 10 billion) for typhoon relief. Yet his budget department would not commit to expediting the funds to provide immediate assistance to affected areas.

Duterte’s claim of “depleted” funds was challenged by left-wing opposition legislators who pointed out that the Philippines was, in fact, the biggest borrower from the World Bank in 2021. Bayan Muna (People First Party) chairperson Neri Colmenares commented:

The country has a history of being ravaged by typhoons, and it should have the budget to mitigate and provide immediate relief even while responding to the pandemic.

Later that week, on December 27, Duterte would draw criticism for suggesting the government should use the relief funds to purchase “trapal” or tarpaulin sheets as temporary shelters for typhoon survivors.

He’s the president. Why can’t I demand for something better than tarpaulin sheets especially since more than a week has passed since Odette? This is an exact quote. It’s not taken out of context. The President literally said let’s buy trapal 2 weeks after Odette hit the Philippines.

Inadequate preparations

Indeed, for many Filipinos, Typhoon Rai’s aftermath once more highlighted the Duterte government’s lack of adequate disaster preparedness and delayed response that had been the subject of scathing public criticism in the past.

Kara Ahorro, a resident of world-renowned surfing paradise Siargao Island, shared that before the storm, she felt confident that Typhoon Rai would not be as strong as Typhoon Haiyan (local name Yolanda) in 2013, in an interview with SunStar news:

It was forecasted to be just 150 kph at its peak, We were here during Yolanda and that was 300 plus kph, though Yolanda did not made landfall in Siargao, we just thought ‘ah, kaya lang’ [we can handle it].

The economic impact has been especially dire on Siargao Island, where resort and business owners had been prepping to open for visitors again after coronavirus travel restrictions were eased during the Christmas holidays.

Speaking to the Guardian, marketing coordinator Elka Requinta shares how the strength of Typhoon Rai caught everyone by surprise in Siargao:

We didn’t expect it to be this bad. You have locals who were hit because I don’t think there was a call for any evacuation from the government.

Blaming Media

But a top Duterte official, Presidential Assistant for the Visayas Michael Dino, blamed the national media for the slow disaster response, claiming they failed to adequately report about the typhoon beforehand.

Journalists pushed back on these accusations, noting the constant steam of coverage in the aftermath of the typhoon amidst great challenges, as Rappler’s Head of Regions Inday Espina-Varona underlines:

From Siargao and Dinagat in Mindanao, Silago, Sipalay, and Ubay in the Visayas, all the way to Palawan, officials and residents waded for hours through mud and water, inching their way through on motorcycles, bangkas, and on foot, just to get their first scratchy messages out into the world. Media reported that.

Ironically, government itself now controls the most extensive regional media network after it denied ABS-CBN, the country’s biggest broadcast network, the right to operate in 2020:

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Political dynasties and billionaires hijack ‘democratic’ party-list system in the Philippines

Party-list seats were first reserved for marginalized sectors of society

By Siegfred Deduro

The “party-list” system, originally designed to provide space for the democratic representation of marginalized sectors in the House of Representatives of the Philippines, has been taken over by political dynasties.

The inclusion of the party-list elections in the electoral system was a result of the political struggle against the Ferdinand Marcos dictatorship which was toppled by the People Power Revolution in 1986. Before the constitutional amendment that enabled the party-list system, it was almost impossible for the marginalized sectors to be represented in Congress. Elected positions from the municipal up to the national levels were monopolized by political dynasties as, historically, elections were won by those who had “guns, gold and goons.”

Article II Section 26 of the 1987 Constitution declares that the “State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.” However, to this day, no anti-dynasty law has been promulgated by the Congress, which is dominated by political dynasties, though a bill nearly succeeded in being approved in the 15th Congress. The bill passed the first and second readings but failed to make it in the final plenary voting. With the enactment of the Party List law in 1995 marginalized sectors gained space in the elite-monopolized Congress. This allowed sectors such as women, workers, farmers, indigenous peoples, and cooperatives to come together, and build coalitions to participate in government. Foremost among the successful party-list organizations were Left-leaning groups, for example, Bayan Muna (People First). Though outnumbered by members of political dynasties, party-list representatives became “fiscalizers” of the people within the legislature.

Some political observers suggest that the party-list system favors a more democratic representation. For instance, among 53 democracies around the world where there are single-member districts, only 7.3 per cent of legislators are women, but in legislatures elected entirely by a party-list, women make up 17.2 per cent of members. But not in the Philippines. Instead, political dynasties saw this system as a backdoor entry to Congress, a means to broaden their turfs and get access to pork-barrel benefits. For example, the son of former President Gloria Arroyo has served in Congress as a party-list representative. Political dynasties-sponsored party-lists win by cheating, vote-buying and patronage politics.

Aside from political dynasties, even billionaires have become legislators by registering as representatives of marginalized groups. For three years now, the country’s richest congressman has been Rep. Michael Romero of party-list group 1-Pacman or One Patriotic Coalition of Marginalized Nationals. His main family business develops and operates port facilities in the country, including the Manila North Harbor.

Veteran lawmaker Edcel Lagman, one of the principal authors of the Partylist System Act, emphasized that:

The purpose [of the system] is to afford and guarantee the marginalized sectors of having representation in Congress which they cannot win in the traditional district elections.

But in 2013 the Supreme Court decided that the party-list was not a reserved-seat system for particular sectors but a system of proportional representation where all types of organizations, including political parties, could participate.

Retired Supreme Court Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban noted that the current party-list system can be “manipulated” to serve the interests of a select few. He called for the urgent revision of the law.

Clearly, the most urgent need of the hour is for legislation to be passed to revise the partylist act and install permanent safeguards to prevent abuses and misuses of the system.

Political science Professor Jorge Villamor Tigno of the University of the Philippines Diliman observed that the inadequacies and conflicting features of the party-list system law can be traced back to its key designer—Congress—whose members may have looked upon the party-list organisations either as potential competitors or useful platforms in their quest to retain their positions of power and privilege. Either way, the lasting effect of the party-list system can be regarded as one that undermines (rather than reinforces) the legacy of People Power.

In the coming 2022 party-list elections, party-lists of the marginalized sectors face formidable challenges. On October 8, the last day of filing of Certificates of Candidacies (COC), a total of 270 party-lists filed their COCs, the overwhelming majority of which are controlled by political dynasties.

Furthermore, the government propaganda network has shifted focus from attacking “drug addicts” to activists, many of whom are party-list members. Online information operations against activists and progressive groups take off from the Rodrigo Duterte government’s drug war playbook—attack online, then kill. 

Bayan Muna Iloilo city coordinator Jory Porquia was gunned down by suspected state agents on April 30, 2020, amid the COVID-19 pandemic.

On August 10, 2020, activist land rights defender and Anakpawis Party-list chairman Randall “Randy” Echanis, 72, was killed inside his home in Quezon City. His body bore multiple stab and gunshot wounds. Echanis had been active in opposing a new anti-terrorism bill, which the President signed into law in July 2020. 

Human rights activist Zara Alvarez was shot and killed by unidentified gunmen in Bacolod City on August 17, 2020. She had been receiving death threats for more than a year. Alvarez was a  former campaign and education director and paralegal in Negros for the human rights group Karapatan. Amid the pandemic, she had been coordinating and conducting relief operations as part of a community health programme. She was the 13th member of Karapatan to be murdered since Rodrigo Duterte came to power in 2016. Other Negros Island-based activists reportedly received threatening messages through their social media accounts saying, “You’re next.”

The government has even moved to disqualify activists from joining the party-list race by branding them as legal fronts of the communist movement. Against forbidding odds, genuine party-lists of the marginalized sectors have to rely on effective campaign strategy, their organized mass base and support of opposition allies to overcome and neutralize the formidable advantages of the party-lists of political dynasties in the coming 2022 elections.

On September 27, the Fifth National Convention of the progressive Makabayan Coalition elected a mixture of seasoned legislators and first-time congressional candidates for its official slate in the 2022 election.

From the party-list groups forming the Makabayan bloc—Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT), Anakpawis, Bayan Muna, Gabriela, and Kabataan—six candidates for the 19th Congress are former lawmakers who held party-list posts.

The coalition has vowed to mobilize its constituency nationwide to launch a strong electoral campaign that adapts to current state-instigated terrorism and restrictions amidst the COVID-19 pandemic. #

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Space for peaceful protests is vanishing in Hong Kong as pro-democracy coalition is disbanded

Civil Human Rights Front announced its disbandment on August 15, 2021

The following post is an English translation of a Chinese report published on Hong Kong-based CitizenNews on August 14, 2021. It is republished by Kodao through Global Voices under a content partnership agreement. 

Civil Human Rights Front (CHRF), a coalition of pro-democracy political and citizen groups for the mobilisation of large-scale rallies, announced its disbandment on August 15, 2021. 

Many anticipated the group would eventually dissolve when the Hong Kong Police Force started investigating the group in April 2021, citing national security concerns

Throughout its tenure, the umbrella organization frequently hosted major mass rallies in Hong Kong, including the 2019 anti-China extradition protests. Since its establishment in 2002, the Hong Kong police had collaborated with the group to ensure rallies were orderly, safe and peaceful. Yet, upon the enactment of the national security law (NSL) on June 30, 2020, the Police Force banned the CHRF’s 2020 July 1 pro-democracy rally for the first time since the annual protests began in 2002, citing COVID-19 and security concerns. In May 2021 the coalition was flagged as an illegal entity.

CHRF has represented the rational, peaceful and moderate front of Hong Kong’s civil society since its establishment. For 18 years, it served as a platform for civic groups to communicate and build consensus on common agendas for positive social change. Though no protests have been organised since the NSL was implemented, police vowed to investigate key figures of the group for potential national security infractions. 

The Civil Human Rights Front’s origins

The Civil Human Rights Front was established in 2002 by Rose Wu, a veteran feminist and a faculty member at CUHK’s School of Theology. The group hoped to provide a loose platform for civil groups to regularly discuss human rights and social justice. Eventually, more than 30 groups had joined the coalition, which was officially launched on September 13, 2002. 

At that time, the most pressing issue in Hong Kong was the legislation of Basic Law Article 23 — a local version of the national security law. The CHRF hosted its first rally in December 2002 against the proposed law and unexpectedly drew 60,000 demonstrators — ten times more than anticipated. 

On July 1, 2003, the CHRF organized its second rally against local national security legislation. Around 500,000 people turned out, making it the second-largest protest in the city since the mass rally against China’s crackdown on the Tiananmen student movement in 1989. The rally forced the Hong Kong government to halt the legislation. 

Since then, July 1 rallies have become an annual event for citizens to voice out their discontent. As the rally host, the CHRF would decide on the annual agenda while other organisations and protesters would use the occasion to voice their demands.

Between 2005 and 2013, the agenda of the annual rally covered a wide range of issues including universal suffrage, minimum wage, environmental concern, property bubbles, the introduction of a national education curriculum and more. The turnout ranged from 21,000 to 430,000 depending on the political climate at the time.

In 2014, 510,000 people joined a rally demanding genuine universal suffrage of the Legislative Council and the Chief Executive. After the rally, two student activist groups, Hong Kong Federation of Student Unions and Scholarism staged a rehearsal of ‘Occupy Central Protests‘, a massive civil disobedience campaign that advocates for democratic election reform with no pre-screening for candidates according to international standards of universal suffrage. During the sit-in, 511 protesters were arrested.

Since then, many started to question the effectiveness of the annual ‘ritualistic’ peaceful rallies organized by the CHRF and called for more radical forms of protest and civil disobedience. 

CHRF: The rational and peaceful front of Hong Kong protests

Civil engagement ebbed after the Occupy Central sit-in protests in 2014 failed to bring democratic changes in the city. As a large number of activists were arrested for participating in the peaceful sit-in, some protesters became sceptical of orderly, symbolic acts of protest in favour of more disruptive resistance. The number of participants in demonstrations dropped dramatically until February 2019 when the government introduced an amendment to the Extradition Bill or The Fugitive Offenders and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Legislation (Amendment) Bill 2019.

In response to the government decision to bypass the Bill Committee and submit the controversial bill directly to the Legislative Council for second reading on June 12, 2019, the CHRF organized the anti-China extradition rally on June 9. The government decided to proceed with the reading despite the 1 million demonstrators who had turned out against the bill. After the rally, some protesters clashed with police outside the Legislative Council. 

On June 12, the CHRF hosted an authorized peaceful assembly at Lung Wui Road. On the same day, some protesters surrounded the Legislature and a few clashed with the riot police. The police force ended up firing tear gas, bean bag rounds and rubber bullets to disperse the protesters, including thousands of peaceful protesters at Lung Wui Road. At the end of the day, the police justified its actions by labelling the protest a riot, a crime that could lead to a maximum of 10 years imprisonment. The CHRF called for another rally on June 16. 

Although the government announced on June 15 they would suspend the amendment to the extradition law, the police operation on June 12 had turned the single-issue protests into a city-wide political movement with five demands: the withdrawal of the fugitive law amendment, holding the police accountable for the violent clampdown on June 12, the release of the arrested protesters, changing the ‘riot’ label of the June 12 protests, and stepping down of the Chief Executive Carrie Lam. Over 2 million people turned out for the June 16 protest, which made headlines worldwide.

After the 2019 July 1 rally, which ended when a few dozen radical activists stormed the Legislative Council complex, the anti-China extradition movement evolved into a series of decentralised protests hosted by different activist groups. Very often, these protests ended in clashes between riot police and protesters. 

In response to the violent clashes between riot police and demonstrators and between pro-Bejing and pro-democracy protesters such as the Yuen Long subway attack incident on July 21, the CHRF hosted a ‘be water assembly’ at Victoria Park on August 18, 2019, condemning the collusion between the police and the pro-Beijing mobs, more than 1,700,000 joined the protest. 

The Hong Kong government and the pro-establishment groups condemned the CHRF and the pro-democracy political parties for not cutting ties with the radical protesters. 

Since March 2021, when Singapore-based Chinese newspaper Lianhe Zaobao reported that the Hong Kong police had launched an investigation on the CHRF, many coalition members have cut ties with the group. One month later in April 2020, the Hong Kong police accused the CHRF of violating the Societies Ordinance for failing to register as a legal entity.  The last convenor of CHRF Figo Chan was sentenced to jail for participating in an illegal assembly on October 1, 2019. The umbrella group was left with no leadership. 

The final disbandment of the CHRF was announced on August 15 through a statement

CHRF originally hoped to continue to face the challenge with everyone in the existing ways, but convenor Figo Chan is already in jail because of several cases, and the secretariat can no longer maintain its operations. With no members participating in the next secretariat, we can only begrudgingly announce our disbandment.

Thailand protests against pandemic mismanagement met with police violence

By Prachatai/Global Voices

A protest in Bangkok against the Thai government’s alleged mishandling of the COVID-19 pandemic was met with police violence on Saturday, August 7. Police used water cannons, rubber bullets, and tear gas against the protestors and arrested at least 18 people.

The protest was organized by the activist group Free Youth and partner organizations, who have made three demands: the resignation of Prime Minister Gen Prayut Chan-o-cha, the reallocation of monarchy and military budgets toward COVID-19 assistance, and replacement of the Sinovac COVID-19 vaccines with mRNA vaccines. This is one of several protests that have been held related to the government’s COVID response.

Organizers met at the Democracy Monument with a plan to march to the Grand Palace. By noon, two hours ahead of the scheduled 2:00 pm start time, around 100 protesters had begun gathering at the Democracy Monument but were faced with lines of crowd control police blocking the planned route.

At 12:25 pm, the police ordered the protesters to end their gathering and crowd control police began to advance on the protesters. There were reports that rubber bullets were used and that 2 protesters were arrested.

Firecracker-like sounds were heard at the scene. Protesters were also reportedly shooting slingshots and throwing glass bottles and rocks at the crowd-control police. Officers in the vicinity were seen wearing bulletproof vests and carrying cable ties, batons, and shields. Some were also carrying rubber bullet firearms.

Due to the crowd control police and other anti-protest blockades, the protesters were repeatedly re-routed on thier march, but eventually ended up at the Victory Monument. The Free Youth announced via their Telegram channel for the protesters to meet at the Victory Monument before marching to the 1st Infantry Regiment headquarters, where PM Prayut lives.

However, protestors found the roads near the 1st Infantry Regiment headquarters closed, as the police had declared them a no-entry zone. The police ordered the protesters back to the Victory Monument, and the protestors refused, sparking. clash.

During the conflict, officers were told that they could use rubber bullets if protesters approached the police lines. The clash lasted for at least two hours, as police fired rubber bullets and tear gas at the protesters. At around 5:20 pm, police began using water cannons.

Tear gas was fired at protesters at the Din Daeng Intersection. Photo by Prachatai

Amid the tear gas, bullets, and water cannons, the protesters were forced to retreat to the Victory Monument and the organizers announced the end of the protest at 5:35 pm.

However, clashes continued at the Victory Monument throughout the evening as crowd control police continued to fire tear gas at the remaining protesters. There were also reports that tear gas was fired from the skywalk above the monument, while water cannon blasts were reported as crowd control police moved toward the momument. Clashes continued until around 9:00 pm.

Several National Human Rights Commissioners weighed in on the protest. Regarding the potential violations of the right to freedom of expression, Commissioner Wasan Paileeklee said that even though there might be a legal framework supporting the police’s operation, their actions must be proportional.

Rows of containers blocked the street at the Nang Leong Intersection. Photo by Prachatai

Activists harassed by officers ahead of protest

Police officers searched several activists’ homes ahead of the protest. Thai Lawyers for Human Rights (TLHR) reported that on Saturday, August 7 that three plainclothes officers and one uniformed officer searched activist Chukiat “Justin” Sangwong’s apartment at 7:30 am. Chukiat said that the officers also asked to see his computer, but he refused, and he was told that he would be charged if he shared images of the search warrant. TLHR said that three plainclothes officers and one uniformed officer also searched the home of a Thammasat University student in Pathum Thani.

Activist Piyarat Chongthep said that at least two members of the We Volunteer protest guard group were followed by police officers who tried to search their houses ahead of the protest. Officers also came to We Volunteer’s headquarters, and Piyarat later told TLHR that around 10 officers were stationed outside the building, threatening that he could be arrested if he left to join the protest.

Piyarat also said that two members of the We Volunteer protest guard group had been arrested at a friend’s house on Friday night August 6. The house was also searched and the two detainees were later released after nothing illegal was found.

TLHR reported that over 15 police officers also raided the residence of a We Volunteer member on Saturday morning, claiming that they had received a report of illegal activities. They arrested at least three people, brought them to the police station, and confiscated their car and mobile phones. No search warrant was presented.

Protest route blocked with oil tankers

Oil tankers blocking the route to the Grand Palace. Photo by Prachatai.

Shipping containers and oil tankers were placed across Sanam Luang on Saturday morning to block the original route of the march to the Grand Palace. A banner saying “The king’s soldiers and the police of the (good) people have joined forces, ready to protect Wat Phra Kaew and the Grand Palace” was hung from the containers.nearby roads were also closed.

TLHR later published a letter from Assistant Police Commissioner Pol Lt Gen Kraiboon Suadsong to the State Railway of Thailand requesting the use of decommissioned train cars and oil tankers to prevent activities risking the spread of COVID-19.

The State Railway Workers’ Union of Thailand (SRUT) then issued a statement calling for decommissioned rolling stock not to be used as barriers, and for an investigation to be launched into how the train cars were taken. They also expressed disagreement with the train cars were used, as the right to peaceful assembly is enshrined in Thailand’s Constitution and in international human rights law.

The SRUT said that there is a risk that dangerous objects could be placed in the cars and oil tankers, potentially causing harm.

At least 18 people arrested

A protester was arrested at the Democracy Monument (Photo from iLaw)

TLHR reported that at least 18 people were arrested before and during Saturday’s protest. TLHR also said that two protesters who were arrested at the Democracy Monument had thier hands tied with cable ties, and one of them showed signs of being assaulted while in detention. TLHR later reported that police officers also detained the driver of a van carrying four speakers after the protest, pushing him to the ground before arresting him.

Eight We Volunteer members arrested before the protest were charged with being members of a secret society under Sections 209 and 210 of the Thai Criminal Code, while the remaining 10 people were charged with violating the Emergency Decree. #

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The original version of this article was published by Prachatai, an independent news site in Thailand, and was edited and republished by Global Voices as part of a content-sharing agreement. It is republished by Kodao as part of a similar agreement.

‘Maohi Lives Matter’: Tahiti protesters condemn French nuclear testing legacy

By Mong Palatino/Global Voices

More than 1,000 people gathered in the Tahiti capital of Papeete to condemn the failure of the French government to take full accountability for its nuclear testing program in the South Pacific.

France conducted 193 nuclear tests from 1966–1996 in Mā’ohi Nui (French Polynesia). France’s 41st nuclear experiment in the Pacific led to catastrophe on July 17, 1974, when France tested a nuclear bomb codenamed “Centaure.” Because of weather conditions that day, the test caused an atmospheric radioactive fallout which affected all of French Polynesia. Inhabitants of Tahiti and the surrounding islands of the Windward group were reportedly subjected to significant amounts of ionizing radiation 42 hours after the test, which can cause significant long-term health problems.

The July 17, 2021 protest was organized under the banner of #MaohiLivesMatter to highlight the continuing fight for nuclear justice. Campaigners said that despite the statement of former French President François Hollande in 2016 recognizing the negative environmental and health impact of the nuclear tests, the French government has done little to provide compensation or rehabilitation to French Polynesia.

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After analyzing 2,000 pages of declassified French military documents about the nuclear tests, in March 2021 a group of researchers and investigative journalists from INTERPRT and Disclose released their findings on the health implications of the experiments.

According to our calculations, based on a scientific reassessment of the doses received, approximately 110,000 people were infected, almost the entire Polynesian population at the time.

The report has revived public awareness in France about the impact of their nuclear testing program. The French government held a roundtable discussion about the issue in Paris in early July. Though some criticized the French government for their alleged lack of transparency around the clean-up efforts in French Polynesia, officials denied these claims.

Protesters in Tahiti insisted that the French government should do more to address the demands of French Polynesian residents. Some noted that if French President Emmanuel Macron was able to seek forgiveness for the role of France in enabling the Rwanda genocide in 1994, he should at least make a similar apology for the harmful legacy of the nuclear tests in the Pacific.

The #MaohiLivesMatter protest has inspired solidarity in the Pacific.

Community leaders of West Papua expressed their support for the protest:

Youth activists from Pacific island nations also took part in the protest:

The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear weapons (ICAN) Australia issued this statement of support:

As you gather in Maohi Nui on the 17th July we offer our deep respects to your leaders and community members who have long spoken out against the harms imposed by these weapons. We have heard your calls for nuclear justice. We continue to listen closely when you speak of the lived experience of the testing years and the on–going harms.

French President Emmanuel Macron is expected to tackle the legacy of nuclear testing during his visit to Tahiti this month. #

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Kodao publishes Global Voices articles as part of a content-sharing agreement.

China wipes out LGBTQ channels on WeChat with no explanation

Some believe the crackdown is related to the three-child policy.

The following post is the English version of a Chinese report written by Rex Yung and published on Hong Kong-based CitizenNews on July 7, 2021. It is published on Global Voices under a content partnership agreement.

By CitizenNews

At least 14 LGBTQ public channels on WeChat, the most popular Chinese social media platform, were permanently blocked on July 6, 2021. All their content vanished without a trace. 

The majority of the channels were run by university-based LGBTQ groups including Purple at Tsinghua University, Colorsworld at Peking University, Gender Equality Research Association at Wuhan University and Zhihe Society at Fudan University. 

Chinese Foreign Affairs spokesperson Wang Wenbin said on July 8 that the removal of LGBTQ channels on WeChat was in accordance with Chinese law:

CitizenNews’ reporters reached out to a number of group administrators through various channels, but they all declined to comment on the incident. 

An LGBTQ activist commented anonymously that the incident had hit the community very hard as they don’t have many in-person opportunities to connect with other LGBTQ people — and now even virtual channels are blocked.  

He revealed that many sexual minority groups had been under pressure because of June’s LGBTQ Pride Month and the 100th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party. The community had faced many verbal attacks on social media in the past few months, but they were shocked that all their accounts were shut down so abruptly. 

According to a report from Reuters, the Chinese authorities have been investigating the loyalty of the university-based LGBTQ groups since May 2021:

Many of the LGBTQ groups blocked on WeChat have been established for many years. For example, the Guangzhou-based Gay and Lesbian Campus Association of China was founded in 2006. In 2014, they published a report entitled ‘Report on the Misrepresentation and Stigmatization of Homosexuality in Chinese High School Textbooks’, criticizing textbooks that reinforced stigmas on homosexuality. One of their members even sued the Ministry of Education for discrimination. 

Founded in 2005, the Zhihe Society of Fudan University is the first student organization that focuses on gender equity in China. Since its establishment, the society had run a play called ‘Monologues from the Vagina’ on campus annually until 2018 when the University authorities stepped in to ban their performance. 

Earlier this year, the Society was punished with a three-month suspension for repeatedly violating the Fudan University Student Association Management Regulations. One of the violations cited by the university administrator was that it had forwarded the announcement of an online lecture on feminism organized by the University of Michigan in the United States. The act was flagged as a ‘very serious violation’ as it mobilized students to participate in activities organized by foreign forces outside of the university. 

In recent years, thanks to the ideological struggle against Western culture, there is a general belief that feminist and queer movements in China are colluding with foreign forces.

Regarding the disbanding of LGBTQ accounts on WeChat, reactions are very polarized on Chinese social media. Those who support equal rights for LGBTQ people are outraged by the crackdown. Some believe that the action has something to do with the three-child policy. One comment on Weibo said: 

“A surge of conservative forces. First they targeted the feminist, then they went after LGBT people. They just want you to go to bed and give birth to three children.”

Another said:

“Gays and Lesbians can’t give birth to three children, this is a policy-backed crackdown on difference.”

As for those who are against LGBTQ rights, they celebrate the disbandment of the public channels on social media and praise the authorities for stepping in to ban LGBTQ groups’ campus activities. 

For example, Mei Xinyu, a researcher at the Ministry of Commerce, wrote in a WeChat post, 

“This is the right way. In dealing with the perverted LGBT, we could allow their existence in silence, but we could not let them enjoy the privilege of standing above other normal people. This is an attempt to protect national security and save the Chinese society from extinction.”

Many criticize the LGBTQ community for taking part in the pride month activities on Weibo. For example, one comment said

“You can say ‘I am gay and I am proud’. But what is the point of saying that in public? Whether you are proud of not has nothing to do with the general public. Have you been oppressed? Are the gay and lesbian being discriminated upon? The rights that they demand is a privilege in the name of the sexual minority.”

A number of posts circulating online speculate that the Chinese LGBTQ community has been infiltrated by foreign forces. Though this is widely viewed as a conspiracy theory, some cited a Weibo post by the U.S. consulates in China supporting LGBTQ rights as evidence.

One such post summed up the US’s plot against China in two points: 

“First, LGBTQI divides people into different groups. This would give space for the US to sow discord and destroy the unity of the Chinese people and instigate internal conflicts; 

“Second, China’s fertility rate has become so low that it must intervene, and while the country has launched the three-child policy and encouraged fertility. Against such background, LGBTQI movement would encourage more Chinese people to become infertile and sabotage China’s population plan.”

China’s official stance on homosexuality has followed a ‘Three No’ policy for many years — no support, no encouragement and no opposition.

The country decriminalized homosexuality in 1997 and removed homosexuality from the list of mental illnesses in 2001. 

In early 2019, China accepted the UN Human Rights Council’s recommendations on improving LGBTQ people’s rights. Though it did not recognize same-sex-partnershipin its updated Civil Code last year.

Suppression of feminist and LGBTQ communities’ online presence has escalated in recent months.

In April, the Chinese social media platform Douban closed at least eight feminist channels. The platforms said the action was taken to prevent the spread of extremism and radical political views. One month later,  Xiao Meili, a well-known feminist, was accused by online nationalists of colluding with foreign forces and supporting Hong Kong independence. Eventually, Xiao, together with more than a dozen feminists who spoke out for her, had their accounts blocked by Weibo.

However, no authority has given any official explanation on the suppressive policies. An LGBTQ rights supporter described the situation as:

“Something covers your mouth and you can’t make any noise. Who should I file the appeal to? You can’t identify who exactly is in charge. Which government authority is staging the clampdown? What kind of power are you confronting? The whole thing is so repressive, suffocating and ridiculous.”

(This report was also published by Global Voices, a content-sharing partner of Kodao.)

Myanmar crackdown intensifies as air strikes lead to more killings and displacement

46 children have died during the protest crackdown and air strikes

By Global Voices South East Asia

This article originally appeared on Medium and was written by a blogger who doesn’t wish to be identified. An edited version is published here.

Note: This article contains disturbing images of violence.

Throughout March 2021, Myanmar’s military regime continued its brutal suppression of civilian movements that were calling for the restoration of democracy in the country since the military coup of February 1.

Since February, protests across the country have been challenging the military rule. Starting in March, the junta ramped up its crackdown on peaceful protesters.

As pressure from the ethnic armed organizations (EAO) grew stronger, the final week of March saw the bloodiest reprisals from the Myanmar military, which launched airstrikes on villages in EAO-controlled areas. As of April 2, 550 protesters, including 46 children, had been killed while around 12,900 villagers have fled their homes to escape clashes between the military regime and EAOs in Karen and Kachin states.

Below is a timeline of violence inflicted by the junta on civilians and protesters during the second half of March:

On March 19, a military operation in a small city of Aung Ban in Shan state was responsible for the deaths of nine protesters.

Starting on March 21, the regime intensified the violence in Taunggyi, the capital of Shan state. Footage shared on Facebook showed soldiers shooting protesters and torturing civilians in their homes.

On the same day, the military ramped up night crackdowns in parts of Mandalay, Myanmar’s second largest city, and killed five people, including a 15-year-old boy. The crackdown continued in Mandalay the next day with the killing of four more people, one of whom was a 13-year-old boy.

On March 23, soldiers raided a home and shot a seven-year-old girl while she was in her father’s arms. Her 19-year-old brother was also severely hit in the head with a rifle butt and was arrested by the soldiers. These children were the first of many victims of military’s intensified attacks against the youth.

In three days of continuous violence in Mandalay, 22 people were reportedly killed.

On March 24, a nationwide “silent day” strike was organized across the country, where people “protested” by not going out on the streets while shops and markets were also closed.

“Day of shame”

On Saturday, March 27, while junta leaders celebrated “Armed Forces Day” in the capital Nay Pyi Taw, the forces of the regime unleashed the most ruthless attack against protesters causing a bloodbath in 40 cities across the country. The death toll reached 114.

That day, five children were also killed. A 13-year-old boy from Mingalar Taung Nyunt ward of Yangon was shot by riot police while he was playing on the street. His body was taken by the police. A one-year-old child was also severely injured with a rubber bullet. By that time, 29 people under 18 had already been killed by the military across the country.

In the city of Dawei, CCTV footage showed the regime’s soldiers on a truck trying to kill three civilians on a motorbike that was merely crossing the street. Two escaped but one person was shot dead.

Perhaps the most heinous crime was a military raid during a night in Mandalay when they burned a resident alive.

Before the bloodbath, the regime confirmed in a state television announcement that it was enforcing a policy of shooting people in the head, and warned that it would do more if people continue protests.

Because of this and the high number of fatalities, the international community dubbed Myanmar military regime’s Armed Forces Day as a “Day of Shame.”

The Armed Forces Day was originally known as Resistance Day when the Myanmar army expelled Japanese forces during the Second World War. Later on, the military junta changed it to Armed Forces Day, locally known as Tatmadaw Day (တပ်မတော်နေ့).

As a symbol of fascist resistance, activists asked the people to come out for nationwide demonstrations on March 27.

Continuing impunity

On Sunday, March 28, the military crackdown in the central city of Monywa, where mass protests had been going on every day, saw five people killed.

In Yangon, there were also reports of the military using live grenades in the neighborhood of Hlaing.

At night, the military launched a crackdown in the city of Pathein in the delta region amid electricity and internet blackouts.

Similarly in Yangon’s South Dagon township, the military used submachine guns during the night crackdown.

The crackdown continued in March 29 in South Dagon, where the regime’s forces used RPG (rocket-propelled grenade) launchers to break down the strong resistance of the protesters. Another person was also found with his/her body burnt at night in the street by the military (it was not clear if he/she was still alive at the time of burning). Twenty-one people were confirmed dead during the two-day clampdown.

Civilians from the city of Kalay and nearby areas, where there is a majority of Chin ethnic people, had been also putting up a tough fight against the military forces for three days since March 30. Seventeen civilians died during that clash.

Air strikes in ethnic villages

Since March 11, the KIA (Kachin Independence Army) had been attacking military bases near Hpa-Kant, a northern town in the Kachin state. The military reportedly retaliated with air strikes against the KIA.

A decade-long civil war between the KIA and the Myanmar military has been ongoing since 2011 with occasional ceasefire agreements.

The KIA claimed that it renewed offensives against the junta because of the Tatmadaw’s atrocities against civilians.

On March 23, the AA (Arakan Army) from the Rakhine state also condemned the violence of the Tatmadaw forces. This was significant because the military granted a ceasefire with the AA when the coup began, which ended bouts of intensified fighting in the Rakhine state that began in 2018. On March 11, the military council had also removed the previous designation of the AA as a terrorist group.

On Armed Forces Day, March 27, the KNU (Karen National Union) attacked and captured a military base near Thee Mutra in the Karen state.

On the same evening, the Myanmar military started retaliating with airstrikes in KNU controlled territories. Continuous aerial bombings during the weekend had forced over 10,000 people from nearby villages to flee their homes. Air attacks continued until March 30 which killed at least 20 civilians.

By March 28, the KIA had captured four military bases near the city of Hpa-Kant. The next day, the military retaliated with an air strike. More people had fled due to the fighting in the Hpa-Kant area.

On March 30, a coalition of ethnic armed groups, namely the MNDAA (Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army), the AA (Arakan Army) and the TNLA (Ta’ang National Liberation Army) released a statement saying they will defend and stand with civilians if military crackdowns continued.

Over 46 children have died in the past two months during the protests and the air strikes since February 1.

People’s defiance

Throughout the second half of March, many cities across Myanmar continued to show defiance by demonstrating in the streets.

In Yangon, having experienced inhumane clampdowns, young people continued to show up in random street lanes within neighborhoods using guerrilla-style tactics to evade military forces.

Protesters also chose unusual hours like dawn or night in organizing actions. Other protests used symbolic actions such as red balloons or flowers, without people to avoid being arrested or killed.

On the night of March 31, the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (a counter government body set up by ousted parliament members), introduced the Federal Democracy Charter as a roadmap to move forward the country’s political future in the fight against the brutal military regime, and declared that the 2008 Constitution, drafted by the previous junta, had been abolished.

Over the next few days, people protested by burning the constitution and also its flag across different cities.

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Kodao publishes Global Voices articles as part of a content-sharing agreement.